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Abstract. With more than 6.3 billion subscribers around the world, mobile de-
vices play a significant role in people’s daily life. People rely upon them to car-
ry out a wide variety of tasks, such as accessing emails, shopping online, micro-
payments and e-banking. It is therefore essential to protect the sensitive infor-
mation that is stored on the device against misuse. The majority of these mobile 
devices are still dependent upon passwords and Personal Identification Num-
bers (PIN) as a form of user authentication. However, the weakness of these 
point-of-entry techniques is well documented. Furthermore, current point-of-
entry authentication will only serve to provide a one-off authentication decision 
with the time between an authentication and access control decision effectively 
becoming independent. Through transparent authentication, identity verification 
can be performed continuously; thereby more closely associating the authenti-
cation and access control decisions. The challenge is in providing an effective 
solution to the trade-off between effective security and usability. 
With the purpose of providing enhanced security, this paper describes a be-
havioural profiling framework, which utilizes application or service usage to 
verify individuals in a continuous manner. In order to examine the effectiveness 
a series of simulations were conducted by utilising real users’ mobile applica-
tions usage. The dataset contains 76 users’ application activities over a four-
week period, including 30,428 log entries for 103 unique applications (e.g. tele-
phone, text message and web surfing). The simulations results show that the 
framework achieved a False Rejection Rate (FRR) of 12.91% and a False Ac-
ceptant Rate (FAR) of 4.17%. In contrast with point of entry approaches, the 
behavioural profiling technique provides a significant improvement in both de-
vice security and user convenience. An end-user trial was undertaken to assist 
in investigating the perceptions surrounding the concept of behavioural profil-
ing technique – an approach that is conceptually associated with privacy con-
cerns. The survey revealed that participants were strongly in favour (71%) of 
using the behavioural approach as a supplement of the point-of-entry technique 
to protect their devices. The results also provided an interesting insight into the 
perceived privacy issues with the approach, with 38% of the participants stating 
they do not care about their personal information being recorded. 
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1 Introduction 
With more than 6.8 billion subscribers around the world, mobile devices certainly 
play a significant role in people’s daily life (ITU, 2014). Indeed, people rely upon 
them to carry out a wide variety of tasks, such as accessing emails, shopping online, 
micro-payments and transferring money via e-banking. These activities are inevitably 
associated with a certain level of personal and/or business information, such as corpo-
rate email, customer data, bank account numbers and personal contact details (Lazou 
and Weir, 2011; Checkpoint, 2013). Therefore, it is essential to protect the sensitive 
information that is stored on the device against threats such as when it is lost or sto-
len, infected by a virus or attacked using social engineering.  
With the aim of protecting these mobile devices from user misuse, two forms of 
authentication techniques (i.e. Personal Identification Number (PIN) and biometrics) 
can be utilised. Currently, the majority of mobile devices are dependent upon the PIN 
as the first line of defence against unauthorised usage. However, the weakness of the 
PIN is well documented in the literature (Clarke and Furnell, 2005; Kurkovsky and 
Syta, 2010; Huth et al, 2012). For example, PINs can be poorly chosen, written down 
on a paper, shared with others or never changed. Biometric authentication is an auto-
matic process to uniquely identify individuals based upon their physical (e.g. face) or 
behavioural (e.g. keystroke) characteristics and traits (Prabhakar et al, 2003). Recent-
ly, biometrics have begun to gain attention in the area of mobile authentication due to 
its ease of use. Indeed, a number of physiological biometric techniques have already 
been commercially implemented on mobile devices as an alternative security control, 
such as the Touch ID on the iPhone 5S and FaceLock on Google Android (Apple Inc., 
2014; FaceLock, 2014).  
As the existing PIN and biometrics techniques are implemented as a point-of-entry 
approach on mobile devices, they will only serve to provide a one-off authentication 
decision where the time between an authentication and a subsequent access control 
decision effectively becoming independent. Through transparent authentication, iden-
tity verification can be performed continuously; thereby more closely associating the 
authentication and access control decisions. The challenge in providing an effective 
solution is determining an optimal level between effective security and usability. To 
this end, this paper presents a novel behavioural profiling framework that provides 
continuous and transparent authentication for mobile devices, an experiment to un-
derpin its capabilities and an evaluation of the technique based upon end users. 
The remainder of the paper is structured in the following manner: Section 2 pro-
vides an insight into the current state of the art; Section 3 and 4 present the behav-
ioural profiling framework and a preliminary evaluation of the framework through 
real user’s application activities respectively. Based upon the promising simulation 
result, Section 5 presents the development of a prototype (called Sentinel). An end-
user evaluation of the behavioural profiling approach is discussed in section 6. The 
paper concludes by highlighting future research directions.   
 
2 Transparent Authentication on Mobile Devices 
The concept of transparent authentication has become an area of active research since 
the turn of the millennium; however, with the significant enhancement of mobile de-
vice functionality, it has grown significantly in recent years (Clarke and Furnell, 
2006; Clarke and Mekala, 2007; DARPA, 2011). It is also commonly referred to as 
continuous or active authentication. There are a number of authentication approaches 
that lend themselves to transparent authentication, such as behavioural profiling, key-
stroke analysis, facial recognition, speaker verification, gait and handwriting (Li et al, 
2013; Clarke and Furnell, 2006; Weinstein et al 2002; Woo et al, 2006; Derawi et al, 
2010; Clarke and Mekala, 2007).  
Whilst much research has been undertaken in some biometric approaches, the 
transparent nature of the authentication approach requires further research – achieving 
point-of-entry authentication represents a significantly different problem to perform-
ing it transparently. Typically, variables that tend to be fixed in a point-of-entry sce-
nario are not in a transparent mode of operation. For example, facial recognition 
would typically operate within an environment with fixed illumination with a facial 
image that is a fixed distance from the camera, with a fixed orientation. Within a 
transparent environment none of these aspects can be fixed – requiring a more flexible 
yet still secure approach. 
As shown in Table 1, research is being undertaken to develop transparent biometric 
approaches and their performance is within the expectations of traditional behaviour-
al-based biometrics in terms of Equal Error Rate (EER). 
 
Behavioural  Techniques EER (%) 
Behaviour profiling (Li et al, 2013) 10 
Gait recognition (Derawi et al, 2010) 20.1 
Keystroke analysis (Clarke and Furnell, 2006) 13 
Handwriting recognition (Clarke and Mekala, 2007) 1 
Speaker verification (Woo et al, 2006) 7.8 
Table 1. The performance comparison of behavioural techniques on mobile devices 
It is the purpose of this paper to focus upon and extend the current state of the art 
within one such area, behavioural profiling. 
3 A Behavioural Profiling Framework 
Based upon the foundation laid by the Transparent Authentication System (TAS) that 
utilises a mixture of biometric techniques to verify a mobile user’s identity in a con-
tinuous and transparent manner (Clarke, 2011), the behavioural profiling framework 
was initially proposed by Li et al (2013). By employing the behavioural profiling 
technique as the authentication method, the framework is designed to work in the 
following style: verifies the user via their app usage in a continuous manner and en-
sures the verification process is carried out in a user-friendly way (i.e. the user is 
mainly verified transparently). The framework can operate in one of the following 
modes: as a standalone security control, within an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
or within a TAS. A number of components have been devised to fulfil the purpose of 
the behavioural profiling framework (as illustrated in Figure 1). Details of them are 
described in the following sections.   
 
 
Fig. 1. A behavioural profiling framework (Li et al, 2013) 
The Data Collection Engine is designed for capturing user’s apps activities. It auto-
matically collects various app features when an app is utilised. The Behaviour Profile 
Engine is used for the generation of various templates via the combination of user’s 
historical data, a dynamic profiling technique and a smoothing function. With the aim 
of maintaining the accuracy of the templates, the dynamic profiling technique updates 
user’s profile on a daily basis. The Behaviour Classification Engine performs the 
verification process whenever is required. 
The Security Status Module is utilised to indicate how secure the system is. The 
framework can provide or deny access to the user when the system is at high or low 
security respectively. The security level of the system is calculated based upon the 
verification result and the quality of the sample being used. The quality factor is dy-
namically allocated to each app based upon their uniqueness (i.e. a higher factor is 
given to the app which is more unique/discriminative to the user). After the activity of 
an app is verified, the security level is increased (verified successfully) or decreased 
(verified unsuccessfully) by the performance factor of the app.  
The Security Manager is central node of the framework as it co-operates with other 
components to complete various tasks, such as continuous verification and automatic 
profile updates. Among these tasks, the key responsibility of the Security Manager is 
to maintain the security level and make subsequent decisions when the user requests 
access to an app; this can be achieved by employing the System Security Status Moni-
tor And Response (SMAR) algorithm that is designed to provide a high level of user 
convenience and improved security (Li et al, 2013). The algorithm employs both 
transparent and intrusive methods to verify a user, with three main checking stages 
before the user is locked out by the device. Hence, it is envisaged that legitimate users 
will mainly experience transparent phases and intrusive challenges will only be uti-
lised to ensure a user’s legitimacy when access to the device is requested but the secu-
rity level is below the requirement. 
4 Empirical Simulation 
With the aim of evaluating the performance of the framework, a simulation process 
was conducted. The simulation utilised a subset of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Reality Mining dataset as its simulating data (Eagle et al, 2009). The 
subset contains 76 users’ 103-app activities during the period of 24/10/2004-
20/11/2004 as illustrated in Table 2. Each user’s data was divided into two halves, 
containing first and second two-week activities respectively. A user’s profile was 
initially obtained by using their first two-week activities; the profile was then dynam-
ically updated on a daily basis. The rest of users’ activities were employed to evaluate 
the performance of the behaviour profiling framework. 
 
 Normal Apps Telephony SMS 
Users 76 71 22 
Unique apps / telephone numbers 101 2,317 258 
Logs 30,428 13,599 1,381 
Table 2. The simulation dataset 
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the Behaviour Profiling framework, the PIN 
based technique was chosen as a baseline method. Therefore, the framework was 
configured to verify a user’s identity as soon as an app is utilised, similarly to the way 
how the PIN functions. Based upon this configuration, all users’ activities were put 
through the framework.  
With the aim of maximising the security, it is assumed that a PIN is required after 
the device has been idle for more than one minute. By utilising this setting, users are 
required to enter a PIN for every single app usage (i.e. no transparent authentication at 
all) if the PIN based technique was applied to the same simulation data. In compari-
son, the simulation result shows that the Behaviour Profiling framework achieved an 
overall FRR of 12.91%, indicating 87.09% of the time legitimate user will be trans-
parently verified and automatically obtain access to the device. With the same config-
uration, the imposter has only a 4.17% opportunity to abuse an app and conversely 
95.83% of the time they will be denied access. Based upon the above discussion, it 
demonstrates that the Behaviour Profiling framework is capable of offering continu-
ous and transparent security for majority of the time and is able to do so in a more 
secure and user convenient fashion. Nonetheless, the Behaviour Profiling framework 
should have a small footprint upon the device, permitting it to be possibly adopted by 
users. With this aim, a prototype of the framework is described in the following sec-
tion. 
5 Sentinel - A prototype of the Behaviour Profiling framework 
Based upon the encouraging simulation results, a working prototype of the Behaviour 
Profiling framework, Sentinel, was developed to demonstrate the concept of the be-
havioural profiling technique on a real mobile device. Sentinel, designed specially to 
have a small memory footprint, is capable of monitoring user’s app activities and then 
identifying the legitimacy of the actions accordingly.  
A Google Nexus smartphone with Android 4.0 was chosen as the development 
platform because the open source nature of the operating system provides a flexible 
environment and also the large amount of market share of the Android presents huge 
number of potential users for the prototype (IDC, 2013). As the Behaviour Profiling 
framework utilises user’s app activities to identify individuals, the initial barrier of 
implementing the Sentinel was whether the prototype can collect features of each 
apps. This was achieved by the support of several Android API classes as demonstrat-
ed in Table 3. As a result, Sentinel is able to collect various features of the app, such 
as time of usage, name of the app, the location of usage. Sentinel utilises the SQLite 
as its database to store user’s app activities. All users’ app activities are stored in the 
SQLite database initially until enough data is collected for building the user’s behav-
ioural profile. By utilising the user’s profile and a dynamic rule-based classifier (Li et 
al, 2013), Sentinel can determine the legitimacy of each user’s app activity and deal 
the classification result accordingly. 
 
Android API class Description 
Activity Manager Interacts with overall activities running on a device 
Telephony Manager Accesses telephony data relating to cellular location 
Location Manager Accesses location data relating to geo-location 
Broadcast Receiver Listens for outgoing call state changes 
Phone State Listener Monitors for incoming call state changes 
Table 3. Android API class for data collection process of the Sentinel 
Once the development of the Sentinel backbone was completed, a graphical user in-
terface was also designed and developed, permitting user to perform various tasks. As 
illustrated by Figure 2, user can start the Sentinel by clicking on the “Start Service” 
button, browse various log files (e.g. an overview of user’s app activities is presented 
by the Application Logs function) and review the classification results (i.e. 0 and 1 
indicate unsuccessful and successful verifications respectively). 
 
 Fig. 2. A selection of screenshots of Sentinel 
As demonstrated above, the prototype of the Behaviour Profiling framework, can 
identify user’s identity based upon their apps usage. In addition, the user will not 
notice its existence because it not only mainly runs as a background service but also 
has a tiny footprint (i.e. 6KB) on the device’s overall memory as illustrated in Table 
4. 
Services Memory 
Logging Service 4.9KB 
Sentinel Activity 896B 
State Listener 80B 
Outcall Receiver 64B 
Reminder 96B 
Total 6KB 
Table 4. An overview of Sentinel’s memory 
6 Evaluation of Behavioural Profiling on mobile devices 
As user acceptance is crucial to the adoption of new technologies and processes, a 
survey was designed to obtain end-user perceptions on the behavioural profiling tech-
nology. The survey contains 9 questions, covering participants’ background of Infor-
mation Technology (IT), how they utilise and secure their devices, and their opinion 
upon the behavioural profiling technique. As the behavioural profiling is a novel au-
thentication technique, a brief description of its working principle was also provided 
to assist participants to understand how the technique provides transparent and con-
tinuous protection for mobile devices. The survey was conducted over the Internet 
and advertised through the use of social networking and word of mouth.  
In total 55 participants completed the survey. The results shows that the partici-
pants have a wide range of technical experience with 9.1% classifying themselves 
with the beginner knowledge of IT category, 56.4% with intermediate knowledge and 
32.7% with advanced or greater knowledge of IT systems. As illustrated in Figure 3, 
participants utilise several operating systems on their mobile phones: Android, iOS, 
Symbian, BlackBerry and Windows with 44%, 23%, 5%, 4% and 4% of users respec-
tively. Despite 80% of the participants utilised smartphones, the SMS and telephony 
functions still remain as the most frequent used apps with 45% and 24% of the users 
accordingly, followed by email and internet browsing with 16% and 9% of the partic-
ipants respectively. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Comparison of participants’ mobile device operating systems 
The survey also revealed that only 56.4% of the participants utilised the point-of-entry 
technique (e.g. PIN) and 54.5% of the participants believe they store important infor-
mation (e.g. email messages and personal contacts) on their mobile devices. It all 
likelihood a far larger proportion of users have sensitive data but merely do not rec-
ognise it. Interestingly, 62% of the participants stated they do care about their person-
al information being recorded, revealing that privacy concerns may not be as great as 
literature suggests. The majority of participants were strongly in favour (71%) of 
using the behavioural approach as a supplement of the point-of-entry technique to 
protect their devices. For those who were reluctant in adopting the behavioural profil-
ing technique, privacy was their primary concern (as illustrated in Figure 4). 
 
 Fig. 4. Reasons for not adopting the behavioural profiling technique 
7 Conclusion 
The first part of the paper identified that authentication is an essential service that 
underpins the security of systems; however, current solutions fail to take appropriate 
consideration of the human-factors of good security design. Through behavioural 
profiling, transparent and continuous authentication provides the opportunity to over-
come the systematic usability issues that exist offering an acceptable, more robust and 
more secure approach. 
Based upon the promising simulation result, a proof of concept and end-user eval-
uation, the approach has demonstrated significant merit. However, care, particularly 
on issues of privacy need to be taken in consideration. In the future, a most robust and 
comprehensive version of the Sentinel should be developed with built-in privacy pro-
tection. This will also allow for a complete and longitudinal end user trial to be con-
ducted.    
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